We are constrained to observe that criminal justice system is not working in our country as it should. The police reforms have not taken place despite directions of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. W..

We are constrained to observe that criminal justice system is not working in our country as it should. The police reforms have not taken place despite directions of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. We do not intend to say anything more in this regard since matter is being dealt with separately by a 3-Judge Bench. The investigators hardly have professional orientation; they do not have modern tools. On many occasions impartial investigation suffers because of political interference. The criminal trials are protracted because of non-appearance of official witnesses on time and the non-availability of the facilities for recording evidence by video conferencing. The public prosecutors have their limitations; the defence lawyers do not make themselves available and the court would be routinely informed about their pre-occupation with other matters; the courts remain over burdened with the briefs listed on the day and they do not have adequate infrastructure. The adjournments thus become routine; the casualty is justice. It is imperative that the criminal cases relating to offences against the State, corruption, dowry death, domestic violence, sexual assault, financial fraud and cyber crimes are fast tracked and decided in a fixed time frame, preferably, of three years including the appeal provisions. It is high time that immediate and urgent steps are taken in amending the procedural and other laws to achieve the above objectives. We must remember that a strong and efficient criminal justice system is a guarantee to the rule of law and vibrant civil society.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Coming back to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in 1holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to Lakshmi. Hence this fi..

Coming back to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in 1holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to Lakshmi. Hence this finding has to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Family Court which may issue notice to Lakshmi and after hearing her give a fresh finding in accordance with law. The question whether the appellant was married to the respondent or not can, of course, be decided only after the aforesaid finding. There is also no finding in the judgment of the learned Family Court Judge on the question whether the appellant and respondent had lived together for a reasonably long period of time in a relationship which was in the nature of marriage. In our opinion such findings were essential to decide this case. Hence we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and Family Court Judge, Coimbatore and remand the matter to the Family Court Judge to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Appeals allowed. 

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Show

It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression 12“relative”, nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.  In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court went wrong in holding otherwise, possibly being influenced by the definition of the expression “respondent” in the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgments and orders, both of the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, dated 15th July, 2009 and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 5th March, 2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No.588 of 2009 are set 13aside. Consequently, the trial Court shall also proceed against the said Respondent Nos.2 and 3 on the complaint filed by the Appellant.

In this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, the trial court ought to have considered whether it was necessary to re-open the evidence and if so, in what manner and to what extent fu..

In this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, the trial court ought to have considered whether it was necessary to re-open the evidence and if so, in what manner and to what extent further evidence should be permitted in exercise of its power under Section 151 of the Code. The court ought to have also considered whether it should straightway recall PW1 and PW2 and permit the Appellant to confront the said recorded evidence to the said witnesses or whether it should first receive such evidence by requiring its proof of its authenticity and only then permit it to be confronted to the witnesses (PW1 and PW2). In view of the above, these appeals are allowed in part. The orders of the High Court and Trial Court dismissing IA No. 216/2009 under Section 151of the Code are set aside. The orders are affirmed in regard to the dismissal of IA No. 217/2009 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. The trial court shall now consider IA No. 216/2009 afresh in accordance with law.

Information Technology Act, 2000 &  Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it sho..

The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". [Para 25] [414-D] 2.1 Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements u/s. 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. [Para 7] [406- F-H] 2.2 A negligent act is an act done without doing something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do or act which a prudent or reasonable man would not do in the circumstances attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species. [Para 6] [405-G-H; 406-A-B] Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) AC 576 - referred to. 2.3 Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factOTHERS A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider to be sufficient consi-dering all the circumstances of the case.

Court have been informed that the appellant is a senior citizen. He is suffering from ‘Endstage Renal Disease’. It appears that he is required to undergo dialysis twice a week. This information is supplied to this Court by D.I.G., Alla..

Court have been informed that the appellant is a senior citizen. He is suffering from ‘Endstage Renal Disease’. It appears that he is required to undergo dialysis twice a week. This information is supplied to this Court by D.I.G., Allahabad range. The appellant’s health condition is, therefore, precarious. While we sympathise with the appellant on this aspect, law must be allowed to take its own course. The appellant, however, will be at liberty to approach the State Government for commutation of his sentence or the Jail Superintendent for premature release under the provisions of the U.P. Jail Manual, a deemed appropriate. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

The extra-judicial confession was made by accused to the prosecution witness in a different background inasmuch as the accused suspected that he had been identified by the witness and he returned to warn her not to divulge any information to anyon..

The extra-judicial confession was made by accused to the prosecution witness in a different background inasmuch as the accused suspected that he had been identified by the witness and he returned to warn her not to divulge any information to anyone - Statement of the prosecution witness recorded u/s. 164 Cr.P.C is almost in identical terms - The very proximity of the murder and the extra- judicial confession made to the prosecution witness shows that the confession is reliable - Also, the alleged murderweapon, had been recovered at the instance of the accused - Though, independent witnesses of the recovery did not support the prosecution, but no reason to doubt the evidence of the Investigating Officer - Thus, prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt - Evidence - Extra-judicial confession. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2006. From the JudgmentAND Order dated 24.8.2001 of the High Court of Gauhati at Gauhati in Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 2000. Praneet Ranjan (A.C.) Rranay Ranjan, Hemant Kr. Yadav, Rajesh Mishra for the Appellant. Avijit Roy Corporate Law Group for the Respondent.

So far as the court is concerned, the petitioner-appellant is a suspect/accused in the offence of murder. No special treatment can be given to the petitioner-appellant simply on the ground that he is a sitting Member of Parliament. However, keepin..

So far as the court is concerned, the petitioner-appellant is a suspect/accused in the offence of murder. No special treatment can be given to the petitioner-appellant simply on the ground that he is a sitting Member of Parliament. However, keeping in view the fact that the CBI has submitted the supplementary charge-sheet and that the trial is likely to take a long time, we deem it appropriate to enlarge the petitioner-appellant on bail, subject to the following conditions: (i) On his furnishing personal security in the sum of Rs.5 lacs with two solvent sureties, each of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the trial court. (ii) The petitioner-appellant shall appear in Court as and when directed by the court. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860              Arms Act, 1959

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. The petitioner has been convicted of serious offences. Of course, his conviction and sentence have been challenged before this Court in an appeal. The petitioner is a well-known cine artist and becaus..

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. The petitioner has been convicted of serious offences. Of course, his conviction and sentence have been challenged before this Court in an appeal. The petitioner is a well-known cine artist and because of his contribution to art and cinema he has got large number of fans throughout the country and abroad. The petitioner is not a habitual criminal nor has it been brought to the notice of the Court that he was involved in any other criminal case. Despite all these favourable circumstances, this is not a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar u/s 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. [Para 6] [193-C-F] 1.2. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court u/s 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. [Para 6] [193-G-H] 1.3. In view of the serious offence of which the petitioner has been convicted by the Special Judge, this Court is not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge. [Para 8] [194-D] Navjot Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab AND ANOTHER (2007) 2 SCC 574, distinguished. Prakash Kumar vs. State of Gujarat (2005) 2 SCC 409 and Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513, cited. Case Law Reference: (2007) 2 SCC 574 distinguished Para 4 (2005) 2 SCC 409 cited Para 4 (1995) 2 SCC 513 cited Para 4 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crl.M.Nos. 4087, 5229, 5230, 5237 AND 5314 of 2009 Criminal Appeal No. 1060 of 2007. IN From the Judgment AND Order dated 31.07.2007 of the Designated Court Greater Bombay, Maharashtra in Bomb Blast Case No. 1/1993. Gopal Subramanium, ASG, Harish N. Salve, Mukul Rohtagi, Soli J. Sorabjee, K.T.S. Tulsi, Ranjit Kumar, Kanak Raj, Mukul Rohtagi, Ankur Chawla, Gaurav Bhatia, Minakshi, Hari Shankar K. Harshvardhan Jha, Vikas Singh, Ashish Jha, Alok Saran, R.S. Massy Verma (for T.N. Rao), Manoj Saxena, Rahul Shukla, Sunil Fernandes, P.V. Yogeswaran, Rajat Jariwal, Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Karan Singh, Hari Shankar K. Vikas Singh, Jangra, Satya Kam, Raghenth Basant (for B.K. Prasad) for the appearing parties.

Arms Act, 1959

The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in c..

The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. The principle has been recognized in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [Paras 13, 14 and 15] [539-F-H; 540-A-E] 1.2 What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. The test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same, and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offences. Thus, it is clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. A person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence. [Para 17] [541-D-E; 543-B-D] Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR 730; S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & ANOTHER (1954) SCR 1150; Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar (1958) SCR 822; The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107; Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682; State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 152- referred to. United States vs. Rabinowith (1915) 238 US 78; T.W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine (1915) 237 U.S.1153; United States vs. Vito Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 314 - referred to. 1.3 The submission that the facts based on which `M' was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and the facts based on which prosecution was initiated resulting in conviction are the same and, therefore, the conviction of `M' is in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not well founded since the same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws.

Criminal appeal should not be dealt in this way - Thus, order of High Court set aside - Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration - Practice and procedure - Show

Criminal appeal should not be dealt in this way - Thus, order of High Court set aside - Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration - Practice and procedure - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Ramesh Chandra Pandey for the Appellant. R. Sundervardan, D. Bharathi Reddy and A. Fatima for the Respondent.

The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the court&n..

The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement, cannot form the basis of conviction. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. If after careful scrutiny, thecourt is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. [Para 16] 1006-H; 1007-A-H; 1008-A-B] 1.2. In the instant case, the trial court found the dying declaration credit-worthy and has held the same to have been made by the deceased `S' in a fit mental state to depose. After making the declaration, she herself signed the same and it also carried an endorsement by the doctor (PW 30) to the effect that she was in a fit mental state. After careful analysis, the trial court as well as the High Court found that there is total clarity in its contents and it is not a case where the deceased was either rambling, unsure or had contradicted herself. There is no compulsion that all dying declarations have to be made before the Magistrate. In the instant case, the Inspector who recorded the statement was cross-examined and the details and his evidence was not shattered by the defence. In fact, not even a suggestion was made to the Investigation Officer about the availability of Magistrate at the relevant point of time. Since the statement of the deceased was very brief as to the circumstances and persons involved who caused brutal injuries on her body as well as her mother and brother, in addition to the same, the doctor (PW 30) has also certified that at the relevant time she was in a fit mental state and endorsed the same by putting his signatures near the signature of the deponent i.e. deceased.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: Whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu i..

Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: Whether prayer for bail would be accepted depends on circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied. The only requirement is that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse-dixit of the detaining authority. On the basis of materials before him, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail. That is his subjective satisfaction based on materials. Normally, such satisfaction is not to be interfered with. On the facts of the case, the detaining authority has indicated as to why he was of the opinion that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail. It has been clearly stated that in similar cases orders granting bail are passed by various courts. Appellant has not disputed correctness of this statement. The High Court was justified in rejecting the stand of the appellant. [728-g-h; 729-a-d] Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr., [2002] 7 SCC 129, distinguished. Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., JT (2006) 6 SC 228 and Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N. and Anr., [2006] 5 SCC 676, relied on. K.K. Mani for the Appellant. V. Krishnamurthy for the Respondents.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court: HELD: 1. The circumstances highlighted by the prosecution against the appellant were that he was acquainted with accused No. 1; that he was found near the place of incident along with Accused No.1 going to the fla..

Dismissing the appeal, the Court: HELD: 1. The circumstances highlighted by the prosecution against the appellant were that he was acquainted with accused No. 1; that he was found near the place of incident along with Accused No.1 going to the flat of the deceased on 8.8.1992 at about 8.30 pm; that Accused No.1 pointed out the appellant as his accomplice and after apprehension as per the voluntary statement made by him, M.Os. 7 and 7a (pillow and pillow cover alleged to have been used for smothering both the deceased) were recovered; that chance finger print of the appellant were found from the scene of offence. The High Court has referred to several factors including the motive aspect. It has referred to the evidence of PWs. 2 & 4, who saw the appellant and A-1 after they came out of the deceased's house. PW4 remembered that the appellant was sitting in the car with A1. The circumstances highlighted by the High Court to hold the appellant guilty cannot be said to be without relevance. The High Court has rightly observed that the trial court did not consider the relevant aspects while directing acquittal of the present appellant. [Paras 6 and 18] [581-H; 582-A-B] 2. Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence. The condition precedent, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned `must' or `should' and not `may be' established; the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. For applicability of Exception 4 of s.300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel, without the..

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. For applicability of Exception 4 of s.300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel, without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1, there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to do deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. [Paras 7 and 8] [1156-G-H; 1157-A-C] 1.2. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. It is to be noted that the `fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. [Para 8] [1157- D, E, G, H; 1158-A] 1.3. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression `undue advantage' as used in the provision means `unfair advantage'. [Para 8] [1158-B-C] 2. Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or unusual manner, the benefit of Exception 4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion, that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide whether undue advantage has been taken. [Para 9] [1158-C-D] 3. From the background facts as considered in the light of the evidence, the inevitable conclusion is that the occurrence took place in course of sudden quarrel. Therefore, Exception 4 to s.300 IPC applies. The appropriate conviction would be under s.304 Part-I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice. [Para 11] [1158-F-G] Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1993) SC 2426 and Iqbal Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 911 SCALE 599, relied on. Case Law Reference: AIR (1993) SC 2426 relied on Para 9 (2008) 911 SCALE 599 relied on Para 10 P.V. Yogeswaran for the Appellant.

Equally without merit is the contention that Ext. P.5 which was authored by PW9 upon examination of the victim neither recorded any injuries on her person nor the fact that she was raped. It is for the reason that PW9 had not recorded any final op..

Equally without merit is the contention that Ext. P.5 which was authored by PW9 upon examination of the victim neither recorded any injuries on her person nor the fact that she was raped. It is for the reason that PW9 had not recorded any final opinion and kept the matter pending, awaiting the FSL Report. Furthermore, in Ext. P.5, she had noticed that her parts were tender to touch. The vaginal swabs and vaginal wash were taken and slides were preserved. She was also sent to the hospital for further examination. Thus, Ext. P.5 cannot be looked into in isolation and must be examined in light of other ocular and documentary evidence. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it was not even expected of PW1 or  the Investigating officer PW11 to examine the victim particularly in relation to her private parts. Absence of such recording does not cause any infirmity to the case of the prosecution much less a reason for acquitting the accused. In our considered opinion, the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record cumulatively and in its correct perspective by ignoring the material piece of evidence and improper appreciation of evidence. It has recorded findings which are on the face of it unsustainable. This error was rightly corrected by the High Court, and we see no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction recorded by the High Court.

Indian Penal Code, 1908

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The circumstances clearly establish that the accused was employed in the hotel and used to sleep in the hotel, and on the night of occurrence both the deceased and the accused were alone in the hote..

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The circumstances clearly establish that the accused was employed in the hotel and used to sleep in the hotel, and on the night of occurrence both the deceased and the accused were alone in the hotel. The evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 in this regard is clear, cogent and credible. Additionally, the accused and the deceased were last seen together on the previous night. The appellant was absconding and was arrested long after the incident. The circumstances are sufficient to hold the accused guilty. [Para 7] [49-E-G] 1.2. However, considering nature of the injuries, the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 (Part II) IPC and custodial sentence of 8 years would meet the ends of justice. Conviction and sentence u/s 392 IPC need no interference. Both the sentences u/ss. 304 and 392 IPC shall run concurrently. [Para 8 and 9] [49-G-H; 50-A, B] V.N. Raghupathy for the Appellant. G. Prakash for the Respondent.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302--Murder by appellant accused of his wife, one son and two daughters by burning--Conviction--Founded on circumstantial evidence--Motive important in cases of circumstantial evidence--But it does not mean that i..

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302--Murder by appellant accused of his wife, one son and two daughters by burning--Conviction--Founded on circumstantial evidence--Motive important in cases of circumstantial evidence--But it does not mean that if prosecution unable to satisfactorily prove motive--Its case must fail--Appellant did not have happy married life with his wife--Court cannot enter into mind of human being--And find out his motive--No reason to disbelieve P.W. 3 or P.W. 5--Accused was last seen with deceased--It is established by evidence of P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5--There was only short interval between this and incident of fire--Victims died in house of accused--No outsider or stranger could have entered house at time of incident--Another link in chain of circumstances connecting accused with crime--Is his sudden disappearance from scene after incident--Plea of alibi was totally false and bogus--All four inmates burnt to death by using petrol--Finding of 10 litre can with some petrol--Clearly showing that petrol, sufficient in quantity to burn and kill all four persons brought by accused--Red bucket found at instance of accused--Was used for pouring petrol on all four victims--168 questions put to accused relating to all circumstances in his examination under Section 313, Cr. P.C.--Prosecution able to establish entire chain of circumstances connecting accused with crime--Hence, appellant was rightly convicted.The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973--Section 366--Indian Penal Code, 1860--Section 302--Murder of wife and three children by appellant--Death sentence--This is rarest of rare cases--Burning living persons to death--Is horrible act causing excruciating pain to victim--And this could not have been unknown to appellant--Person like appellant who instead of doing his duty of protecting his family--Kills them in such cruel and barbaric manner--Cannot be reformed or rehabilitated--Balance sheet heavily against him--Death sentence awarded to him--Upheld.Death sentence--Cases warranting death penalty--Are honour killing, fake encounter by police, dowry death and hired killing.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302/3..

Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302/34, 120B and 201--Arms Act, 1959--Section 25--Murder--Conviction and sentence--Appellants alleged to have snatched away deceased along with cot at point of firearms--Thus, appellants convicted only for offence under Section 201--Ingredients of Section 201--No doubt that appellants had requisite knowledge about commission of offence--In view of concurrent findings of courts below, no case made out for interference--However, all appellant aged more than 70 years--In view of their age and in view of fact of their non-connection with first part of occurrence of commission of murder--They are sentenced to period already undergone in interest of justice.#The ingredients of Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code are as under (1) that an offence has been committed ;that the accused knew or had reason to believe the commission of such offence ; that with such knowledge or belief he-- (a)caused any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, or b) gave any information respecting that offence which he then knew or believed to be false ; that he did as aforesaid, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment; if the charge be of an aggravated form, as in the present case, it must be proved further that the offence in respect of which the accused did as in (3) and (4) was punishable with death, or with imprisonment for life or imprisonment extending to ten years.

Bombay High Court confirmed order of conviction and enhanced sentence of life imprisonment to death and ordered to be hanged till death - Hence, present Appeal - Held, Apex Court in a recent judgment in Rajesh Kumar v. State through Government of ..

Bombay High Court confirmed order of conviction and enhanced sentence of life imprisonment to death and ordered to be hanged till death - Hence, present Appeal - Held, Apex Court in a recent judgment in Rajesh Kumar v. State through Government of NCT of Delhi held that object of hearing under Section 235(2) of CrPC, being intrinsically and inherently connected with sentencing procedure, provisions of Section 354(3) of CrPC, which called for recording of special reason for awarding death sentence, must be read conjointly - Court held that, such special reasons could only be validly recorded, if an effective opportunity of hearing as contemplated under Section 235(2) of CrPC, was genuinely extended and was allowed to be exercised by accused who stand convicted and was awaiting sentence - High Court had only mechanically recorded what Accused had said and no attempt had been made to elicit any information or particulars from Accused or prosecution which were relevant for awarding a proper sentence - No genuine effort had been made by Court to elicit any information either from accused or prosecution as to whether any circumstance existed which might influence Court to avoid and not to award death sentence - Awarding death sentence was an exception, not rule, and only in rarest of rare cases, Court could award death sentence - State of mind of a person awaiting death sentence and state of mind of a person who had been awarded life sentence might not be same mentally and psychologically - Court had got a duty and obligation to elicit relevant facts, even if accused had kept totally silent in such situations - In instant case, High Court had not addressed the issue in correct perspective bearing in mind those relevant factors, while questioning Accused and, therefore, committed a gross error of procedure in not properly assimilating and understanding purpose and object behind Section 235(2) of CrPC - Matter remitted to High Court to follow Section 235(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure in accordance with principles laid down - Conviction awarded by High Court, however, stand confirmed - Appeal allowed

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The duties, functions and powers vested in an authority by a Statute are relatable to the source which prescribes such functions and powers. The ambit, scope and effect of exercise of such power can be tested by two different concepts i.e. quo mod..

The duties, functions and powers vested in an authority by a Statute are relatable to the source which prescribes such functions and powers. The ambit, scope and effect of exercise of such power can be tested by two different concepts i.e. quo modo and actio quaelibet it suia via. In what manner the powers are to be exercised as per the prescribed procedure, the performance or action must follow its prescribed procedure. On applying the above stated principles and testing them with reference to the maxims stated (supra), it is not possible for the Court to hold that either the manner of functions and powers of Police Patil or method in which they are to be performed are equatable to the authority, powers and functions of a Police Officer, in law. Therefore, we are unable to contribute to the view that Police Patil is a Police Officer in law for all intent and purpose and confession before him would attract the bar contemplated under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 

In the result, we are of the opinion that for  proving   a   dying   declaration recorded   by  a person/Magistrate/Executive   Magistrate   it   is &nb..

In the result, we are of the opinion that for  proving   a   dying   declaration recorded   by  a person/Magistrate/Executive   Magistrate   it   is   not essential   requirement   of   law   that   the   recorder should   repeat,   while   deposing   before   the   Court, the   contents   of   the   declaration   in   the   words spoken   by   the   deceased   as   to   the   cause   of   his death   or   as   to   any   of   the   circumstances   of   the transaction   which   resulted   in   his   death. In other words, the recorder of a dying declaration need   not   depose   before   the   Court,   in   the   words spoken   by   the   deceased,   about   the name/description,   and   the   act   of   the   accused, which   resulted   in   his   death.     Accordingly,  the question referred to this Full Bench is answered in negative

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 19.6.2007, passed by the trial Court in SC 3-J/VII/06 (S.T.No.06/07), titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs v. Kewal Krish..

For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 19.6.2007, passed by the trial Court in SC 3-J/VII/06 (S.T.No.06/07), titled as State of Himachal Pradesh Vs v. Kewal Krishan alias Kalu, is set aside and the accused is acquitted of the charged offences. He be released from jail, if not required in any other case. Amount of fine, if deposited by the accused, be refunded to him. Release warrants be prepared acordinlgy. 

Arms Act, 1959

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Criminal - Murder - Death sentence - A minor boy aged 10 years was murdered after he was subjected to carnal intercourse and then strangulated to death - Accused was charge-sheeted with offences punishable under Sect..

Criminal - Murder - Death sentence - A minor boy aged 10 years was murdered after he was subjected to carnal intercourse and then strangulated to death - Accused was charge-sheeted with offences punishable under Sections 302, 377 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - High Court had confirmed the death sentence - Appellant, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and all the circumstances put together would lead to only one inference that the accused was not guilty of the offences charged against him - Held, the prosecution succeeded in establishing its case beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused and that the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court call for no interference - In the instant case the crime test and criminal test stood fully satisfied against the accused - Life of a boy, the only son of the mother, was taken away in a gruesome and barbaric manner which pricks not only the judicial conscience but also the conscience of the society - Legislative policy is discernible from Section 235(2) read with Section 354(3) of the Cr.P.C., that when culpability assumes the proportions of depravity, the Court has to give special reasons within the meaning of Section 354(3) for imposition of death sentence - Legislative policy is that when special reasons do exist, as in the instant case, the Court has to discharge its constitutional obligations and honour the legislative policy by awarding appropriate sentence, that is the will of the people - Incarceration of a further period of thirty years, without remission, in addition to the sentence already undergone, would be an adequate punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case, rather than death sentence - It was ordered accordingly